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STANDARDS AS BARRIERS VERSUS
STANDARDS AS CATALYSTS:
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF HACCP
IMPLEMENTATION ON U.S. SEAFOOD IMPORTS
SVEN M. ANDERS AND JULIE A. CASWELL
The United States mandated a Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) food safety standard
for seafood in 1997. Panel model results for 1990 to 2004 suggest that HACCP introduction had
a negative and significant impact on overall imports from the top thirty-three suppliers. While the
effect for developed countries was positive, the negative effect for developing countries supports
the view of “standards as barriers” versus “standards as catalysts.” A different perspective emerges
from individual country-level analysis. Regardless of development status, leading seafood exporters
generally experienced a positive HACCP effect, while most other smaller trading partners faced a
negative effect.
Key words: developed and developing countries, food standards, international trade.
As one of the world’s largest producers and
importers of fishery products, the issue of
seafood safety is of particular concern to the
United States. The risks associated with do-
mestic and imported products motivated the
introduction of a mandatory Hazard Analysis
Critical Control Points (HACCP) approach to
food safety regulation in seafood processing in
1997.
In considering the effect of higher food
safety standards, such as HACCP, the conven-
tional wisdom in the literature held that such
standards in developed countries amount to
“standards as barriers” to trade that are fre-
quently used as protectionist tools that disad-
vantage developing countries. A more recent
and less pessimistic view emphasizes the op-
portunities provided by emerging food safety
standards and the possibility that developing
countries could use them to increase their com-
petitive advantages. This “standards as cata-
lysts” view argues that compliance with new
food standards may provide incentives for
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countries to modernize their export-oriented
sectors, as well as to strengthen the levels of
food and health standards at the national level.
We evaluate these two hypotheses by ana-
lyzing the impact of mandatory HACCP mea-
sures introduced in 1997 on imports to the
United States by the thirty-five largest seafood
exporting countries, of which twenty-six are
developing and nine developed countries. The
data set includes the pre-HACCP period 1990–
97 and the post-HACCP period 1998–2004. We
test the hypotheses by analyzing the overall
impact of HACCP adoption on U.S. seafood
imports and whether there was a differential
effect for developed and developing country
exporters over time. We then test for HACCP
trade effects at the individual country level, al-
lowing for differential effects not categorized
by development status. Our results contribute
to the discussion of the impact of changing food
safety standards on the competitiveness of de-
veloping countries in international trade.
Food Safety and Trade: Empirical Evidence
There is a fairly extensive literature on the
general effects of food safety standards and
the Agreement on the Application of Sani-
tary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agree-
ment) under the World Trade Organization
(WTO) on developing countries. For example,
Jaffee and Henson (2004) and the World Bank 
(2005) argue that standards can act to impede 
trade flows by explicit bans but more probably 
through prohibitive costs of compliance, par-
ticularly for poorer countries. The investment 
and recurrent “costs of compliance” to pen-
etrate high-income markets could undermine 
the competitive position of many developing 
countries or narrow the profitability of high-
value food exports.
However, Jaffee and Henson (2004) and the 
World Bank (2005) highlight potential oppor-
tunities arising from developments in stan-
dards. Certain countries may be able to use 
the new standards environment to their com-
petitive advantage and increase their market 
shares in trade. This possibility depends on the 
modernization of supply chain structures in 
export-oriented industries in developing coun-
tries. Jaffee and Henson conclude that the sim-
ple black and white argument between food 
safety “standards as barriers” and “standards 
as catalysts” is more complex in reality. The 
issue requires close analysis of the dynamics 
of particular standards, markets, products, and 
countries.
To date, only a few studies have used empir-
ical data to estimate the impact of national and 
international food safety regulations on trade 
flows (Paarlberg and Lee 1998; Calvin and 
Krissoff 1998; Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh 
2001; Wilson and Otsuki 2004; Maskus, Otsuki, 
and Wilson 2005; Peterson and Orden 2005). 
A common result is that more stringent food 
safety standards set by developed countries 
tend to deter trade supporting the view of 
“standards as barriers.” Overall, changes in 
trade patterns related to standards take place 
within the context of broader changes. For ex-
ample, Carrere (2006) finds that the effects of 
regional trade agreements on trade flows have 
become quite powerful in explaining changing 
patterns of food trade.
Seafood markets have attracted less at-
tention even though seafood consumption 
accounts for a disproportionate share of food-
borne illnesses in the United States (U.S. GAO 
2001) and other OECD countries (Cato and 
Lima dos Santos 1998). Martı´nez-Zaroso and 
Nowak-Lehmann (2004) explore the export 
potential of MERCOSUR countries in a lib-
eralized European Union (EU) market. Panel 
model results suggest strong correlations be-
tween the overall level of EU market protec-
tionism and the growth rate of MECOSUR 
exports. In particular, the authors found the 
category of fishery products faced high barri-
ers to trade from EU protection.
Debaere (2005) empirically investigates the 
impact of changing trade policies, in particular 
the EU zero tolerance policy for antibiotics, on 
the global shrimp market. He shows that the 
EU policy, mainly the loss of Thailand’s pref-
erential status in the EU, enforced differences 
in international safety standards leading to a 
disruption of trade flows from Europe toward 
the United States. This led to a significant de-
crease in U.S. shrimp prices and caused a U.S. 
antidumping case against six Asian shrimp ex-
porting countries. Finally, Peridy, Guillotreau, 
and Bernard (2000) apply a panel model to 
analyze the economic factors affecting seafood 
imports into France. However, the influence of 
food safety standards is not central because the 
impact of trade barriers is reflected in a very 
broad manner that does not account for safety 
regulations.
Whether food safety standards operate pre-
dominantly as barriers or catalysts is largely 
unresolved in the empirical work to date. 
The analysis here estimates the magnitude of 
import changes emerging from stricter food 
safety standards in the form of mandatory 
HACCP requirements and provides direct 
tests of the hypotheses of “standards as bar-
riers” versus “standards as catalysts” for de-
veloping country exports.
U.S. Seafood Trade, International Food 
Safety, and HACCP
Although the United States is one of the 
world’s largest exporters of seafood, its an-
nual trade deficit in fishery products has been 
rising to nearly $8 billion in the past fifteen 
years (NMFS 2005b). Seafood from foreign 
countries is filling a growing share of the U.S. 
seafood market, which has grown over 50%
since 1980.
By 1998 imported seafood comprised 63%
of U.S. consumption. The share of imports 
reached a peak of 76% of edible seafood con-
sumption in 2002 (NMFS 2005b). Import vol-
ume has increased from 1997 to 2004 for both 
developing and developed countries. Out of 
the largest thirty-five seafood exporters that 
supplied approximately 95% of the U.S. im-
ports from 1996 to 2004, twenty-six are devel-
oping countries1 that account for 71% of edible 
seafood imports (USDA/FAS 2004) and nine
1 Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, China, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Korea, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Russian
Federation, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago,
Venezuela, and Viet Nam.
are developed countries.2 The net foreign ex-
change receipts derived from fish in develop-
ing countries increased from $11.6 billion in 
1992 to $17.4 billion in 2002. In 2002, develop-
ing countries accounted for more than 49% of 
the total worldwide value of seafood exports 
(FAO 2004).
In 1997, a mandatory HACCP requirement 
was adopted for the seafood industry in the 
United States. We hypothesize that, all else 
equal, the introduction of mandatory HACCP 
had a negative effect on U.S. seafood imports. 
If standards act as barriers for developing 
country exporters, there should be a differen-
tial negative effect for these countries when 
compared to developed countries. However, if 
standards act as catalysts for developing coun-
tries as a group, we would expect no differen-
tial negative effect due to HACCP for these 
countries. Alternatively, it may be that stan-
dards operate as a barrier or catalyst at the 
country level independent of development sta-
tus. In this case, we would expect to see differ-
ential effects on exports for countries based 
on country characteristics such as the size of 
the export industry and whether they already 
had relatively high food safety standards, could 
mobilize to meet HACCP requirements, or 
had lower compliance costs. Further, we ex-
amine whether these effects differ in the short 
run immediately after the new standards went 
into effect versus the longer term.
The Panel Model Approach to Analysis
of HACCP Trade Impacts
Different methodological approaches have 
been applied to disentangle the complicated 
trade effects of food safety standards. Maskus, 
Wilson, and Otsuki (2001) summarize alterna-
tive approaches to estimating the impact of 
standards in general on trade. Previous stud-
ies by Swann, Temple, and Shurmer (1996), 
van Beers and van den Bergh (1997), Peridy, 
Guillotreau, and Bernard (2000), and Wilson 
and Otsuki (2004) discuss the advantages of 
econometric methods, especially the gravity 
equation approach, for the analysis of stan-
dards in international trade.
Our model uses a variant of the classic grav-
ity equation to analyze the effects of the U.S. 
HACCP food safety standard on logarithms of 
bilateral trade flows. The general gravity model
2 Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, Singapore, and the United Kingdom.
is specified as
ln Importsxi t
= 0 + 1(Timet ) + 2(HACCPi t )
+ 3 ln(GDPt ) + 4 ln(Sizeit)
+ 5 ln(Exchangei t ) + 6 ln(Distancei )
+ 7 (MERCOSURi ) + 8 (NAFTAi )
+ 9 ln(ASEANi ) + 10 ln(APECi )
+ 11 ln(ANDEANi ) + 12 ln(GEOi ) + εi .
(1)
Table 1 presents definitions and descrip-
tive statistics of the dependent and indepen-
dent variables. Importsxit denotes the imports
of seafood from country i to the United States
in a particular year t for the years 1990–2004
(NMFS 2005a, 2005b). Superscript x stands for
either the volume of imports (ImportsQit ) or the
dollar value of imported seafood (Imports$it).
The error εi is assumed to be normally dis-
tributed with mean zero. Trade data for Korea
and Vietnam were incomplete and dropped,
yielding a panel data set of the thirty-three
leading exporters to the United States.
Time has the value one to fourteen for the
fourteen years of observations. HACCP re-
flects the implementation and enforcement of
HACCP requirements by FDA; it equals one
for 1998 to 2004 and zero in previous years.
Ideally, a more fine-grained policy variable
would be desirable that captures how effec-
tively and quickly HACCP requirements were
put in place in different exporting countries
and how effective import inspection systems
were in determining compliance with HACCP.
However, data do not exist for such a vari-
able. Here, GDP, as a proxy for U.S. seafood
demand, is the real per capita GDP of the
United States in 2000 U.S. dollars, and Size
is a proxy for the importance of international
seafood trade in each exporting country. It is
the sum of seafood imports and exports from
FAO’s database (FAO 2005).3 Alternatively,
“mass” is measured by Export, the value of
exports of total goods and services of each
country, Exchange is the market exchange rate
between the U.S. dollar and the domestic cur-
rency of each exporting country, and Distance
3 Using Size as a measure of an exporting country’s significance
in seafood trade with the United States, a common variable in grav-
ity models, may cause endogeneity problems and potentially bias
HACCP estimates. The coefficient of correlation between Size and
the value (volume) of shipments to the United States from country
i is 0.34 (0.38). However, when we instrument for Size using Ex-
port, the instrumental variable model estimates of HACCP effects
were largely unchanged.
Table 1. Definitions of Variables and Sample Statistics
Standard
Variables Variable Description Mean Deviation
Dependent Variables
Importsxit Annual volume of imported seafood into the United States by
country i (million metric tons)
42.77 66.57
Imports$it Value of annual seafood imports into the United States by country
i (million U.S. dollars)
216.37 343.70
Independent Variables
Timet Trend 1990–2004 8.27 4.67
HACCPt Introduction and enforcement of mandatory HACCP standards in
U.S. seafood (1998–2004 = 1)
0.47 0.50
GDPt Real per capita U.S. GDP (1,000 U.S. $) 29.53 7.01
Sizeit Total annual volume of seafood imports and exports of country i
(million metric tons)
143.16 1.51
Exportit Annual export value of total goods and services of country i
(billion U.S. $)
60.58 95.05
Exchangeit Real exchange rate between U.S. $ and domestic currency i (value
of one dollar in terms of domestic currency i)
697.50 2,706.34
Distancei Geographical distance between country i and the United States
(thousand miles)
4.92 2.97
MERCOSURi Dummy variable for MERCOSUR member countries: Argentina,
Brazil
0.06 0.24
NAFTAi Dummy variable for NAFTA members countries: Mexico, Canada 0.04 0.21
ASEANi Dummy variable for ASEAN member countries: Indonesia,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
0.12 0.32
APECi Dummy variable for APEC member countries: Australia, Canada,
Chile, China, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand
0.37 0.48
ANDEANi Dummy variable for ANDEAN member countries: Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela
0.12 0.32
Geoi Geographical connection between fishery exporting countries
(South America = 1; Australasia = 2; Europe and Canada = 3)
1.76 0.73
is the geographical measure of distance from
the United States.
Five variables account for membership
in regional trade agreements: MERCOSUR,
NAFTA, ASEAN, APEC, and ANDEAN;
they equal one in years when the agreement
was in force in country i and zero otherwise.
Also, Geo is a classification variable, indicat-
ing geographical connection between seafood
exporters and the United States that may in-
volve historic ties. As we could not identify
clear colonial ties for the United States, this
variable has three groups of geographically ho-
mogeneous countries controlling for the omit-
ted variable problem of country ties in trade
flow analysis: South American countries are
captured in Geo1, Australasian countries are
included in Geo2, and European countries and
Canada are in Geo3. South Africa is the only
African seafood exporting country in the data
set; it is included in the Australasian country
group.
Regarding the signs of the first derivatives
of the independent variables, we hypothesize
that, all else equal, adoption of the HACCP
standard has had a negative impact on U.S.
seafood imports, while increases in U.S. GDP
have had a positive impact. The size of the ex-
porting country’s economy (Size or Export) is
hypothesized to have a positive impact, while
the foreign exchange rate to the U.S. Dollar
(Exchange) is expected to show a negative sign.
The impact of geographical Distance is hypoth-
esized to be negative. All other signs are am-
biguous; there are different hypotheses on the
influence of time, trade agreements, and geo-
graphical connection.
Empirical Analysis of HACCP Effects
on Seafood Imports
The panel of fishery product import data is esti-
mated across thirty-three exporting countries
= 0 + 1(Timet ) + 2(HACCPi t )
+ 3 ln(GDPt ) + 3 ln(Sizei t )
+ 5 ln(Exchangei t )
+ 6 ln(Distancei ) + εi .
for the time period 1990–2004 using alterna-
tive model specifications based on the general 
gravity model in equation (1). Model 1 is the 
benchmark specification of the gravity equa-
tion. It controls for the impact of mandatory 
HACCP requirements for seafood on trade 
flows into the United States. Other included 
variables are a time trend (Time), a proxy for 
U.S. seafood demand (GDP), the size of the 
exporting country’s seafood sector (Size), ex-
change rate (Exchange), and geographical dis-
tance (Distance):
(2)
ln Importsxi t
Model 2 adds variables for regional trade
agreements (MERCOSUR, NAFTA, ASEAN,
APEC, and ANDEAN) allowing for tests
of whether these agreements have significant
effects on seafood imports into the United
States:
ln Importsxi t
= 0 + 1(Timet ) + 2(HACCPi t )
+ 3 ln(G D Pt ) + 4 ln(Sizeit )
+ 5 ln(Exchangei t ) + 6 ln(Distancei )
+ 7(MERCOSURi ) + 8(NAFTAi )
+ 9(ASEANi ) + 10(APECi )
+ 11(ANDEANi ) + εi .
(3)
Model 3 introduces alternative specifica-
tions for two types of variables in order to
test the robustness of the results. The value
of a country’s total export of goods and ser-
vices (Export) is used as an alternative to
test whether the size of an exporting coun-
try had a differential effect on seafood trade
with the United States. The variables Geo1 and
Geo2 are used as an alternative specification
of country-group-specific effects on seafood
trade previously represented by the regional
trade agreement variables:
ln Importsxi t
= 0 + 1(Timet ) + 2(HACCPit)
+ 3 ln(GDPt ) + 4 ln(Exporti t )
+ 5 ln(Exchangeit) + 6 ln(Distancei )
+ 7(Geo1i ) + 8(Geo2i ) + εi .
(4)
The panel nature of the data may in-
troduce heterogeneity biases requiring ap-
propriate econometric methods to separate
time-series and cross-sectional effects. Initial
ordinary least squares (OLS) panel estimates
revealed significant first-order serial correla-
tion. We therefore apply exact maximum like-
lihood estimators (ExactML). The parameter
estimates are corrected for first-order serial
correlation of the residuals, and stationarity
of the time-series properties is imposed (Beach
and MacKinnon 1978). Given the large num-
ber of country-pair relations in the data set
taken from a larger population, we treat
the corresponding country effects as random.
However, Hausman test results are reported
with each regression model.
The choice of the estimation procedure
is motivated by different factors. First,
fixed-effect models are inappropriate when
time- and product-invariant variables such as
geographical distance are included, because
fixed-effects estimators eliminate all time-
invariant variation (Peridy, Guillotreau, and
Bernard 2000; Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004).
Consequently, random-effects estimators are
more appropriate given the importance of the
distance variable for trade flow analysis. There
are good reasons for arguing that country-
specific fixed effects come to the fore especially
when stricter food standards may boost or
hamper trade flows across countries. Of course,
such factors are deterministically linked with
individual country specifics, which may not
be considered as random. While Otsuki, Wil-
son, and Sewadeh (2001), Wilson and Otsuki
(2004), and Blind and Jungmittag (2005) apply
fixed-effects models, Egger and Pfaffermayr
(2004) and Peridy, Guillotreau, and Bernard
(2000), among others, doubt the appropriate-
ness of such models in trade flow analysis.
This is especially the case, when time-invariant
geographical distance variables are included in
gravity equations, which is the most prominent
example.
Table 2. Gravity Model Random-Effects Estimates of HACCP Impacts on U.S. Seafood
Imports, 1990–2004a
Dollar Value of Imported Seafood Volume of Imported Seafood
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Time 0.041∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.008
(4.43) (4.96) (1.94) (2.60) (3.89) (0.80)
HACCP −0.598∗∗∗ −0.408∗∗∗ −0.036 −0.420∗∗∗ −0.331∗∗∗ −0.020
(−5.71) (−4.08) (−0.34) (−3.29) (−2.84) (−0.17)
GDP 0.622∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.022
(17.68) (11.04) (3.57) (12.62) (7.62) (0.77)
Size 0.406∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗
(11.16) (6.59) (9.76) (5.73)
Export 0.324∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(7.33) (5.76)
Exchange −0.013 −0.019 0.043 0.007 −0.003 0.073∗∗
(−0.62) (−0.71) (1.64) (0.28) (−0.08) (2.52)
Distance −0.212∗∗ −0.010 −0.684∗∗∗ −0.110 −0.246∗ −0.719∗∗∗
(−2.48) (−0.08) (−5.24) (−1.10) (−1.90) (−4.83)
NAFTA 1.41∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗
(4.09) (2.35)
ASEAN 0.685∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗
(3.56) (3.68)
APEC 0.793∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗
(4.39) (6.47)
ANDEAN 0.502∗∗ 0.331
(2.21) (1.28)
GEO1 1.082∗∗∗ 1.557∗∗∗
(4.56) (5.74)
GEO2 0.015 0.066
(0.07) (0.30)
Rho  0.84 0.85 0.85 0.79 0.83 0.82
DW 1.71 1.63 1.67 1.74 1.76 1.74
Hausman 0.60 4.73 0.96 0.15 0.87 0.14
Adj. R2 0.77 0.79 0.76 0.74 0.78 0.72
No. 492 492 492 492 492 492
Fb 10.97 16.73 24.15 17.25 15.98 23.82
Note: Single asterisk (∗), double asterisks (∗∗), and triple asterisks (∗∗∗) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
a Random-effect estimates corrected for first-order serial autocorrelation. The t-statistics (in parentheses) computed with White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors.
b Critical F value computed according to Leamer (1994, p. 114).
Overall Effects of HACCP Implementation
Table 2 presents estimation results for Mod-
els 1–3 in two groups. The first uses dollar
value of imported seafood as the dependent
variable, while the second uses the volume
of imported seafood. The random-effects es-
timates of the gravity models are generally
well behaved. Double-logarithmic specifica-
tions generated the best parameter estimates
in all models and allow for the direct inter-
pretation of coefficient elasticities. Statistically
significant F-tests reject the null hypothesis of
equivalence of OLS and fixed-effects models
at the 95% level. Fixed-effects models were
largely outperformed by random-effects mod-
els as indicated by the Hausman tests.4
The results presented in table 2 support
the hypothesis that, all else equal, manda-
tory HACCP implementation had an over-
all negative and significant effect on seafood
imports into the United States. The elastic-
ities of HACCP effects across model spec-
ifications are calculated from the estimated
model coefficients for this dummy variable
4 The estimation of fixed-effects models revealed parameters
values of similar magnitudes. These results are presented in ta-
ble S1 of the supporting Appendix (Anders and Caswell 2008) to
this article.
using the procedure proposed by Halvorsen 
and Palmquist (1980) in order to produce a the-
oretically consistent interpretation of the esti-
mated magnitudes. HACCP elasticities range 
from −0.03% to −0.59% with respect to the 
value of imported seafood products. This effect 
translates to an average marginal annual loss 
in trade value of $2.6 and $51.7 million, respec-
tively. The HACCP effect on import volumes 
was up to −0.42% or an average marginal de-
crease of 9,537 metric tons. Thus for importers 
as a whole, HACCP posed a significant bar-
rier to selling into the U.S. market. In com-
parison, the gravity equation panel model of 
Peridy, Guillotreau, and Bernard (2000) shows 
a significantly negative but rather marginal 
(−0.092) impact of trade barriers on aggre-
gate seafood imports into France from 1988 to 
1994.
The benchmark Model 1 and alternative 
Models 2 and 3 support a positive time trend in 
seafood imports into the United States with re-
spect to both values and quantities of seafood. 
This underscores an important point that over-
all imports were increasing; the marginal im-
pact of HACCP was to dampen this trend. Real 
GDP per capita, as a proxy for U.S. per capita 
demand, is positively related to seafood im-
ports. Our results indicate that a 1% increase 
in U.S. per capita GDP led to a 0.62% increase 
in the value of seafood imports. The volume 
effect on seafood imports, with an increase of 
up to 0.53%, is of similar magnitude.
The geographical distance variable shows 
the hypothesized negative effect on seafood 
trade in all model specifications with the ex-
ception of Model 2 for the dollar value of im-
ports. The elasticity estimates indicate trade 
effects from increasing transport and transac-
tion costs. However, the magnitudes of these 
distance effects tend to be lower than those of 
Peridy, Guillotreau, and Bernard (2000) who 
report a significant distance elasticity of −0.74 
for seafood imports into France.
The panel regressions also highlight the sig-
nificance of the “mass” variable (Size) as a ma-
jor factor in explaining trade flows. The impor-
tance of each country’s seafood sector, in terms 
of the total value of fishery trade, has a signif-
icant and positive effect on its ability to pen-
etrate the U.S. market. This trade facilitating 
effect is confirmed in the alternative specifi-
cations for the dollar value of total exports in 
goods and services (Export) as a proxy of coun-
try i’s export orientation. A 1% increase in a 
country’s value of total exports is associated
with an increase of seafood exports (value and
volume) of around 0.3%.
The effect on seafood imports of the foreign
exchange rate to the U.S. dollar is inconclusive
across model specifications. This contrasts with
a theoretically plausible and significant posi-
tive exchange rate elasticity of 0.97 reported
by Martı´nez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann
(2004) for seafood exports by MERCOSUR
countries. Peridy, Guillotreau, and Bernard
(2000) report a nominal exchange rate elas-
ticity of −0.54.
To the best of our knowledge, this study
is the first to explore the effects of regional
trade agreements and geographical connec-
tions among countries on seafood trade flows.
The results of Model 2 show significant positive
effects of relevant trade agreements for both
dependent variables. NAFTA has the greatest
positive impact of 1.4% on the value of U.S.
seafood imports, while exports of APEC mem-
bers are about 1.3% higher in terms of vol-
umes.5
Model 3, which includes the impact of
geographical connections, shows that South
American countries (Geo1) have better access
overall to the U.S. seafood market compared
to the residual group of European countries
and Canada. Their export advantage is 1.1% in
value of product and 1.6% in export volume.
In contrast, the group of Australasian coun-
tries (Geo2) has no significant competitive ad-
vantage compared to European countries and
Canada.
Developing and Developed Country Effects
of HACCP Implementation
To specifically address the “standards as barri-
ers” versus “standards as catalysts” views, we
test for differential HACCP effects between
developing and developed countries with sep-
arate panel regressions of the benchmark
Model 1. The model allows a focus on the dif-
ferential impact of HACCP on country groups
and countries, while accounting for other ma-
jor factors that affect seafood trade with the
United States.
The “standards as barriers” view hypothe-
sizes a differential negative effect of HACCP
adoption for developing countries. In contrast,
developed countries, which largely account
5 Due to insignificant results, the variable MERCOSUR was
dropped from Model 2 for both specifications of the independent
variable.
Table 3. Overall Short- and Long-Run Elasticities of HACCP Effects for All, Developing, and
Developed Countriesa
Estimates of HACCP Elasticities All Countries Developing Countries Developed Countries
1990–2004 Dollar value of U.S. −0.598∗∗∗ −0.748∗∗∗ 0.212
(long run) Seafood imports (−5.71) (−6.62) (1.36)
Volume of U.S. −0.420∗∗∗ −0.662∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗
Seafood imports (−3.29) (−5.25) (2.46)
1990–99 Dollar value of U.S. −0.710∗∗∗ −0.740∗∗∗ 0.227
(short run) Seafood imports (−6.13) (−5.99) (1.55)
Volume of U.S. −0.604∗∗∗ −0.694∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗
Seafood imports (−4.41) (−4.59) (2.62)
Note: Single asterisk (∗), double asterisks (∗∗), and triple asterisks (∗∗∗) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
a ExactML random-effect estimates of HACCP elasticities based on Model 1 for 1990–2004 (the long run) and 1990–99 (the short run) subsamples of the panel
data set. Results are corrected for first-order serial correlation. The t-statistics (in parentheses) computed using White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors.
for the enforcement of enhanced food qual-
ity and safety standards, may experience a less
negative or a positive effect of HACCP intro-
duction on exports to the United States. In-
dustrialized countries are assumed to have the
resources to adapt more quickly to increases
in standards. Moreover, a negative effect on
exports from developing countries in the post-
HACCP period may allow developed coun-
tries to add market share in seafood trade with
the United States.
The estimates of HACCP elasticities for U.S.
seafood imports for the entire period of 1990–
2004 (referred to as the long run) from all,
developing, and developed countries are re-
ported in the upper panel of table 3. As dis-
cussed above, HACCP implementation had
a significantly negative effect on trade flows
across all exporting countries when measured
over the entire long-run time period from 1990
to 2004 and with controls for other determi-
nants of seafood trade such as time, U.S. GDP,
distance, and export orientation. Similarly, the
point elasticities of the HACCP trade flow ef-
fects for developing countries are consistently
negative and significant over this period. They
exceed the overall negative HACCP impact
levels for all countries. Developing countries’
relative marginal loss in seafood trade with
the United States is −0.75% of export value,
while the marginal effect on export volumes is
−0.66%. This translates to an average marginal
annual loss in export value of $46.1 million
and an average marginal loss in volume of
8,026 metric tons. In contrast, the effect for
developed countries is positive but not statis-
tically significant for the dollar value of im-
ports and positive and significant in terms of
volume of seafood imports, where the marginal
effect is 0.44% or equivalently 1,972 metric
tons.
Comparing results, Otsuki, Wilson, and Se-
wadeh (2001) forecast a negative impact of
stricter standards on exports to the EU from
developing countries in Africa. Their elasticity
estimate predicted that tighter standards for
Aflatoxin B1 in the EU would result in signifi-
cant negative trade flow effects for imports of
fruits, nuts, and vegetables from African coun-
tries. Jaffe and Henson (2004) later concluded
that the effects were negative but not as large
as predicted. Wilson and Otsuki (2004) also
predicted a significant negative effect on im-
ports from the introduction by the EU of a
new pesticide standard for bananas. Our re-
sults over the entire period 1990–2004 using a
classification of exporting countries as devel-
oping or developed provide an ex post analysis
that supports the finding that enhanced food
safety standards in developed countries can act
as barriers resulting in significant reductions in
exports from developing countries.
For countries with limited investment re-
sources, it could be argued that the successful
adoption of food safety standards is a matter
of time. For example, Donovan, Caswell, and
Salay (2001) report a transition period of two
months up to five years for the implementa-
tion and full compliance with HACCP stan-
dards in the Brazilian fish processing industry.
As a consequence, countries that are immedi-
ately in compliance may expand their market
shares at the expense of those who are not—at
least in the short run.
To explore differential effects over time,
we compare HACCP elasticities estimated
over the entire longer-run period 1990–2004, 
which includes seven years under the HACCP 
requirement (shown in the upper panel of 
table 3), to those over the shorter-run pe-
riod 1990–99 (shown in the lower panel of 
table 3), which includes the first two years 
of the HACCP requirement. The results re-
veal significant differences in the magnitude 
of HACCP effects between the long and 
short run. For all countries, the short-run 
HACCP elasticities are of greater magnitude 
for both the dollar value and volume of seafood 
imports. The overall long-term pattern of a 
negative HACCP effect on developing and a 
positive effect on developed countries holds 
in the short term as well. Moreover, the re-
sults do not show that the negative effect for 
developing countries began to be mitigated 
in the longer run; the HACPP effects for the 
two periods do not show a significant differ-
ence. Overall, the results based on compar-
isons of developing versus developed countries 
as groups support the hypothesis of “standards 
as barriers.”
Country-Specific Effects of HACCP 
Implementation
While the previous results support the “stan-
dards as barriers” hypothesis, these results 
may mask differences in country-level effects 
within the developing and developed country 
groups. To explore possible differences, we es-
timated mixed linear panel models (Verbeke 
and Molenberghs 1997) that merge a vector 
of unknown fixed effects and a vector of un-
known random effects, thus allowing for a 
simultaneous disclosure of random- and fixed-
effect properties of the panel data variables.
In the underlying theoretical mixed-linear 
model, the dependent variable y denotes the 
vector of observed yis. On the right-hand side, 
X is the known matrix of xijs, is represent 
the unknown fixed-effects parameter vector, 
Z is the known matrix of zis, and  is a vec-
tor of unknown random-effects parameters 
(De Leeuw 2005). The country-level effects 
of HACCP requirements were estimated us-
ing the benchmark Model 1 with fixed HACCP 
effects for the thirty-three countries exporting 
to the United States. Table 4 shows country-
level pre-HACCP seafood imports and esti-
mates of the short-run (1990–99) and long-run 
(1990–2004) total trade flow effects of HACCP 
when other major determinants of seafood 
trade are controlled for. These effects are het-
erogeneous among developing and developed
countries, and in some cases in the short versus
the long run.
A surprisingly clear pattern of individual
country trade responses emerges based on the
pre-HACCP size of the country’s seafood ex-
ports to the United States. The larger exporters
gained from the introduction of stricter food
safety regulations. Twelve of the top fifteen
suppliers of seafood to the United States had
strictly positive trade flow effects in the short
and long run post-HACCP periods. In contrast,
ten of the eighteen smaller exporters experi-
enced negative short- and long-run HACCP
effects, while an additional four experienced a
negative long-term effect. Developing and de-
veloped countries are both fully represented
among the large and small exporters, and thus
among the marginal gainers and losers, in the
post-HACCP adoption period.
Comparison of short- and long-term effects
at the country level underscores that the ag-
gregate analysis showing developing countries
losing and developed countries gaining rel-
atively under HACCP may be misleading.
Among the twenty-four developing countries
that were in the top thirty-three exporters to
the United States, ten showed long-term gains
and fourteen showed losses under HACCP,
all else equal. Marginal gainers are concen-
trated among large exporters and losers among
small exporters. Among these smaller ex-
porters, the magnitudes of negative trade flow
effects across developing countries range from
−$6.9 to −$44.8 million based on the 1997 pre-
HACCP export values of seafood products.
Meanwhile, among the nine developed coun-
tries six showed gains and three losses in the
long run.
While the HACCP effect for developed
countries was predominantly positive, de-
veloping countries had a mixed experience.
Considered on a country level, neither the
“standards as barriers” or “standards as cata-
lysts” hypothesis fits developing countries as a
whole. Instead, the data suggest that among de-
veloping countries increased standards act as a
catalyst for larger, more established exporting
countries and a barrier for smaller exporters.
To our knowledge, this analysis is the first to
present estimates of the country-specific im-
pacts of stricter food safety standards across a
broad panel of bilateral trade relations with the
United States. Analyzing trade effects at a dis-
aggregate, country level provides valuable in-
formation on the impacts of stricter food safety
regulations that is not available from a more
aggregate analysis.
Table 4. Magnitudes of Country-Specific HACCP Effects on U.S. Seafood Salesa
Pre- HACCP Imports
to the United States Short Runb Long Runc
(1997) (1998–99) (1998–2004)
HACCP Impact HACCP Impact
Country Rank (U.S. $ million) (U.S.$ million) Change (%) (U.S. $ million) Change (%)
Canada 1 1,305.92 383.1 +29.3 511.47 +39.2
Thailand 2 1,166.99 357.27 +30.6 433.95 +37.2
Ecuador 3 714.87 126.12 +17.6 131.85 +18.4
Mexico 4 492.19 113.49 +23.1 72.66 +14.8
China 5 321.19 42.67 +13.3 159.80 +49.7
Chile 6 316.74 76.64 +24.2 231.73 +73.2
Indonesia 7 251.10 46.14 +18.4 160.81 +64.0
Russia 8 230.12 −61.53 −26.7 −31.47 −13.7
Japan 9 203.88 29.48 +14.5 41.32 +20.3
Taiwan 10 187.34 −26.36 −14.1 −15.04 −8.0
Iceland 11 184.30 27.71 +15.0 15.09 +0.8
India 12 170.86 34.34 +20.1 89.15 +52.2
Philippines 13 139.84 36.23 +25.9 59.93 +42.9
Bangladesh 14 134.32 −19.83 −14.8 −43.09 −32.1
New Zealand 15 133.22 17.71 +13.3 53.79 +40.4
Norway 16 125.50 −38.60 −30.8 −81.13 −64.4
Panama 17 112.99 −13.11 −11.6 −18.28 −16.2
Venezuela 18 99.70 −12.89 −12.9 −28.33 −28.4
Honduras 19 99.39 14.68 +14.8 3.11 +0.3
Argentina 20 88.79 0.04 +0.05 −12.81 −14.4
Singapore 21 75.16 −3.81 −5.1 −24.46 −32.5
Costa Rica 22 73.60 0.51 +0.7 −6.86 −9.3
Nicaragua 23 71.39 −10.87 −15.2 −7.79 −10.9
Brazil 24 69.58 1.46 +2.1 33.09 +47.6
Peru 25 65.77 −22.01 −33.7 −44.76 −68.1
Australia 26 53.95 5.37 +9.9 42.80 +99.4
Bahamas 27 39.30 −2.85 −7.1 −13.90 −34.8
Colombia 28 37.02 −9.11 −24.6 −14.39 −38.9
South Africa 29 31.06 3.77 +12.1 −13.21 −42.5
Trinidad and 30 29.02 2.94 +10.1 −13.22 −45.6
Tobago
Guyana 31 28.20 −2.16 −7.7 −10.61 −37.6
United 32 19.50 −2.92 −14.9 +4.95 +25.4
Kingdom
Denmark 33 17.53 −5.5 −29.7 −8.48 −48.4
aResults are obtained through ExactML pooled panel regressions corrected for serial correlation. The t-statistics (in parentheses) computed with White’s
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
bCalculations based on pooled panel regression of benchmark Model 1 for value of seafood imports, n = 330.
cCalculation of HACCP effects based on pooled panel regressions of Model 1a, n = 495.
Conclusions
Food-borne safety risks associated with do-
mestic and imported seafood products moti-
vated the introduction of mandatory HACCP
for seafood products in the United States in
1997. From the point of view of the United
States and other developed countries, regula-
tory standards such as this are intended to re-
duce potential risks. However, they can also
create nontariff trade barriers and significant
trade redirections. The conventional wisdom is
that increased food safety standards in devel-
oped countries amount to “standards as barri-
ers,” particularly for developing countries. An
alternative view sees the potential for “stan-
dards as catalysts,” as developing countries re-
act to new standards with increased investment
in quality assurance.
This article contributes to this discussion by
estimating the trade impact of the 1997 in-
troduction of HACCP in the United States
for domestic and imported seafood products. 
We apply panel data on seafood imports to 
the United States by the thirty-three largest 
exporting countries between 1990 and 2004. 
Twenty-four of these countries are developing, 
while nine are developed. The results of ex-
tended gravity models indicate a significantly 
negative impact of the HACCP standard on 
U.S. seafood imports across all thirty-three 
exporting countries, dampening the overall 
growth of these imports. The results are ro-
bust in terms of effect on product values and 
trade volumes. Comparison of trade effects for 
developing versus developed countries at an 
aggregate level supports the “standards as bar-
riers” hypothesis. While developing countries 
as a group suffered a negative trade effect un-
der HACCP, developed countries, again as a 
group, gained under HACCP.
A different picture emerges, however, based 
on estimates of country-specific HACCP im-
pacts. These reveal considerable differences 
across countries with regard to the pattern 
of short- and long-run post-HACCP trade 
flow effects. A clear majority of the larger 
seafood exporting countries gained increas-
ing trade with the United States, all else 
equal, in the post-HACCP period. In contrast, 
most smaller exporters experienced short- and 
long-run negative trade effects after the U.S. 
HACCP standard was adopted. Developing 
countries were among both groups, suggesting 
that “standards as catalysts” applies to larger, 
more established exporters among develop-
ing countries and “standards as barriers” to 
smaller exporters.
Overall, the results emphasize the impor-
tance of more detailed quantitative economic 
modeling at the standard, market, product, and 
country levels to inform the discussion of the 
role of food safety standards as nontariff bar-
riers in international trade, especially for de-
veloping countries. Economic analysis of the 
trade effects of increased food safety measures 
can be useful in the development of more ef-
fective food safety systems, in particular by 
developed countries. Such analysis can also 
support measurement of the welfare effects of 
food safety standards for individual develop-
ing countries.
[Received May 2007;
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